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UNAC OPORD



FWD HQ UNAC  
GALASI, PROVINCE of FELLARI, CARANA

D+30

OPS 007

OPERATION ORDER 01

References: A. CARANA Training Scenario – Base Scenario Package – Version 1.1, May 2009  
B. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1544

Time Zone: CHARLIE

Task Organization: See Annex A

1. SITUATION.
   1. General. CARANA has experienced internal conflict for over ten years. The central government authority was in danger of collapse and the traditional clan structures, supported by neighbouring countries and using violence against local population had fragmented the country and condemned thousands of Caranans to death by starvation. Sustained efforts by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) finally resulted in the KALARI Treaty reached between the Government of Carana, the Mouvement patriotique de Carana (MPC) and the Independent combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC). This created the conditions to form a Government of National Reconciliation and hold a general election within 18 months. In the same agreement, the Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and the armed components of the MPC and ICSC agreed to a ceasefire. The new government has been formed and plans are underway for elections to be held in the near future. While the ceasefire is generally holding, tensions between the factions remain high and there is a great deal of suspicion from all sides that the election will not be free or fair.
   2. Despite some international community humanitarian relief attempts, the overall situation in CARANA has not improved. It has worsened, especially in the refugees camps, and has by now reached crisis level. There is an urgent need to act.
   3. The international community has asked the United Nations (UN) to intervene with a military force. In view of this situation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted a resolution at their 126th meeting in January this year establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for a period of six months and further defined that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 military personnel to address the situation.
   4. Belligerent Forces. The belligerent organizations and capabilities are defined in Annex B, Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) 01 of this operation order (Op O). There are two major belligerent groups: the CDF and the MPC. Neither side has the military strength to dominate the country to any extent. These two belligerent groups remain deployed in defensive positions but are capable of limited local offensive actions. A third armed group, the ICSC, is an unstructured formation of rebels. Their capabilities are very limited and generally consist of conducting terrorist‑like actions against the CDF in the LEPPKO Province and harassing the local population.
      1. CDF. The CDF has a strength of approximately 10,000 all ranks. It consists of four “area commands”, all less than brigade strength, and a small air force. The CDF is considered the official armed forces of CARANA. Its equipment has suffered previous years of fighting and is in a poor state of maintenance. Of the three areas, the Northern Area headquartered in MARONI is the most effective and the Central Area in FOLSA is the least effective.
      2. MPC. The MPC comprises approximately 10,000 personnel of whom approximately half have returned home and, although they have retained their weapons, are currently inactive. The remainder are organized in groups of 750 men and deployed in camps of approximately 250. They are equipped with assault rifles, light mortars and anti‑tank weapons. Most of their vehicles are in a poor state of repair with shortages of spares and fuel restricting operations.
      3. ICSC. The ICSC consists of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 fighters with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non‑combatants.
   5. Friendly Forces.
      1. UNSC’s Intent. The UNSC intent is to create a secure, stable, democratic and economically sound CARANA, thus promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region.
      2. Special Representative of the Secretary General’s (SRSG’s) Intent. The SRSG wants to quickly establish a secure and stable environment in CARANA by conducting military operations using minimum force, in order to allow all of the UNAC organizations to provide the urgently needed humanitarian assistance and allow the development of the conditions for the rebuilding of the country, including a general election.
      3. SRSG’s Concept of Operations. In order to implement the UNSCR, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, UNAC is to carry out peacekeeping operations within CARANA. It is to ensure that while doing so, it remains an impartial force and is perceived as such by all belligerent parties. It is to do all it can to fulfil its mandate through negotiation and mediation, having gained the consent, trust and cooperation of all the belligerent factions at all levels. Where negotiation has failed, UNAC may take the necessary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of the Republic of CARANA.
      4. UN Components and Agencies in Theatre. The UNAC military force is one of the components available to the SRSG/Head of Mission (HoM) in CARANA to achieve the objectives set in the UNSCR. It is a vital component as it provides the overall security and adequate stability for other UN and UN components to complete their role. These other components in CARANA include:
         1. administration office;
         2. civilian police (CIVPOL);
         3. electoral division;
         4. human rights;
         5. public Information;
         6. child protection and education;
         7. rule of law;
         8. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and
         9. security.
      5. United Nations High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR) will also be present in CARANA. They are the lead agency for the refugee camps outside CARANA and so outside the UNAC mandate.
      6. The UNAC military forces will operate with UN related organizations, African Regional and civilian organizations, international organizations (IOs) and non‑government organizations (NGOs). These organization's efforts are coordinated by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, the International Committee of the Red Crystal (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are present in CARANA.
   6. Attachments and Detachments. See UNAC Task Organization Table (Annex A) for all military forces in UNAC.
2. MISSION. UNAC will implement UNSCR no later than (NLT) D+60 in order to create the conditions for a more secure and stable environment in CARANA.
3. EXECUTION.
   1. UNAC Force Commander’s intent. Force Commander UNAC’s intent is to capitalize on the renewed good will of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He wishes to quickly establish contact with all parties and factions involved and develop sector and local level cooperation based on consensus. The quick UNAC Forces entry in CARANA and the implementation of control measures will create the conditions for the provision of humanitarian relief and allow all of the UN and UN organizations to achieve their mission and democratize the country. At the same time, our success in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure their support to us.
   2. UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.
   3. UNAC Centre of Gravity (CG). The legitimacy of the mission as evidenced by international support and the mandate authorized by the Peace and Security Council.
   4. UNAC Concept of Operations. UNAC will conduct its operations along five major lines of operations. Decisive points (DPs) for each line of operations are detailed in Annex C.
      1. Stabilize the country.
      2. Secure the country.
      3. Coordination with all parties involved.
      4. Establish viable new CARANA Armed Forces.
      5. Obtain the support of the citizens of CARANA.
   5. To secure and stabilize the country UNAC Forces will be deployed quickly and deal swiftly with any breach of the agreement from the signing parties. During Phase 1, UNAC Forces will adopt a very cooperative approach with all military factions and at the same time be ready to revert to a more aggressive posture. Special efforts will be required with those that do not follow the content of the KALARI Treaty. Of particular importance during this phase, all conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be established and maintained. This will be followed by direct and indirect military support actions aimed at securing further the environment.
   6. The initiation of activities such as DDR will be fully supported during Phase 2. This will create added security and in turn facilitate the safe return of refugees and deportees. Once the desired level of security and stability are achieved, UNAC Forces will switch its main effort in support of the democratization process including the conduct of a general election and the rebuilding of the CARANA Armed Forces and Police Force. Throughout the mission, UNAC forces will ensure the protection of all UN components, related organizations and CARANA civilians by coordinating their actions, monitoring all factions activities and maintaining a 24/7 capability to take appropriate actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as necessary. Flexibility will be ensured by a strong and very mobile quick reaction force.
      1. Phase 1 - Deployment. UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, 3 Sector HQ with assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERINI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organizations will also deploy and Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) down to provincial level throughout the country. Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the ceasefire within boundaries, establish humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining quick reaction forces at mission and sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to contingent level during this phase.
      2. Phase 2 - Implementation. During the second phase, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:
         1. Return of refugees and deportees.
         2. Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities.
         3. Security operations in support of the electoral process.
         4. Facilitate creation of the country legal structure.
      3. Phase 3 - Sustainment. In Phase 3, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:
         1. the conduct of elections;
         2. the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police Force;
         3. contingent rotations; and
         4. monitor and report of human rights violations.
   7. Grouping and Tasks.
      1. Grouping as per Annex A.
      2. Phase 1 - Tasks - Sector 1.
         1. Deploy in the city of GALASI.
         2. Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within boundaries.
         3. Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries.
         4. Provide a quick reaction force of coy size at 12 hours notice to move.
         5. Participate in the mission information campaign.
      3. Phase 1 - Tasks - Sectors 2 and 3.
         1. Deploy contingents assigned to sector once entering area of operations (AO).
         2. Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
         3. Protect all airports/airfields within boundaries.
         4. Monitor the withdrawal of CDF, MPC and ICSC from confrontation lines in cantonment areas and establish zones of separation (ZOS) in areas of tension.
         5. Promote and ensure freedom of movement.
         6. Secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the relief of suffering.
         7. Contact other non-signing armed factions, if any within AO, and develop local consensus to conform to the intent of the KALARI Agreement.
         8. Participate in the mission information campaign.
      4. Phase 2 - Tasks - Sector 1.
         1. Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within boundaries.
         2. Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries.
         3. Provide protection and support to electoral division personnel when needed.
         4. Provide a quick reaction force of company size at 12 hours notice to move.
         5. Participate in the mission information campaign.
         6. Assist rule of law division with escort protection as required.
         7. Participate in the mission information campaign.
         8. Monitor the demobilization and disarmament of members of the Democratic Fighters Independence Movement (DFIM) and People’s Armed Movement (PAM) and other factions.
      5. Phase 2 - Tasks - Sectors 2 and 3.
         1. Maintain AO secured 24/7.
         2. Maintain freedom of movement throughout AO.
         3. Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
         4. Protect all airports/airfields within boundaries.
         5. Provide escort protection to electoral division personnel when needed.
         6. Establish assembly zones (AZs) and CA for former fighters of the MPC, ICSC and other armed groups, if any, within AO, in preparation of demobilization.
         7. Monitor the demobilization and disarmament of members of the MPC, ICSC and other factions.
         8. Be at 72 hours notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of DDR and human rights activities.
         9. Assist rule of law division with escort protection as required.
         10. Participate in the mission information campaign.
      6. Phase 3 - Tasks - Sector 1.
         1. Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within boundaries.
         2. Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries.
         3. Provide protection and support to the electoral division personnel.
         4. Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process while in the city of GALASI.
         5. Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force.
         6. Provide a quick reaction force of coy size at 24 hours notice to move.
         7. Assist rule of law division with escort protection as required.
         8. Participate in the mission information campaign.
         9. Monitor and assist as necessary and as per capability the demobilization and disarmament of members of the MPC, ICSC and other factions.
         10. Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of the electoral process.
      7. Phase 3 - Tasks - Sectors 2 and 3:
         1. Maintain AO secured 24/7.
         2. Maintain freedom of movement throughout.
         3. Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
         4. Protect all airport/airfield within boundaries.
         5. Provide escort protection to electoral division personnel when needed.
         6. Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process.
         7. Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force.
         8. Be at 48 hours notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of human rights activities.
         9. Monitor overall humanitarian situation and report all human rights violations.
         10. Participate in the mission information campaign.
         11. Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of the electoral process.
   8. Coordinating Instructions.
      1. Timings.
         1. Phase 1 to be completed as soon as possible.
         2. Phases 2 and 3 will be initiated by this HQ.
         3. DDR process to begin immediately – New CARANA Armed Forces declared operationally ready (OPRED) within six months.
         4. Elections date to be confirmed (TBC).
      2. Boundaries. Sector AOs are assigned as per Annex D.
      3. Movement. All contingents’ movement in and out of theatre will be this HQ’s responsibility. Once within sector boundary, Sector HQ are responsible for all UNAC troop and all other UN and UN organizations movement.
      4. Civil‑military Cooperation (CIMIC). All contingents CIMIC initiative will be coordinated through the CIMIC sub-committee of the JCC.
      5. Aviation Support Request. Request for Aviation Support to be forwarded 72 hours in advance to this HQ.
      6. Liaison. Sectors are to exchange Liaison Officers (LOs) with neighbouring formations. All liaisons with neighbouring countries will be initiated by this HQ.
      7. Coordination.
         1. Daily brigade/sector report to be submitted by 1600 hrs to this HQ.
         2. UNAC Morning Coordination. UNAC morning coordination conference will be held at 0930 hrs.
         3. DDR. Sector/Brigade HQ to coordinate DDR support activities with CARANA DDR Commission.
         4. Coordination points between sectors/brigade as per standing operating procedure (SOP). Info this HQ when coordination points are manned.
         5. All UNAC armed forces support to police training will be coordinated through UN CIVPOL.
         6. Direct liaison with all other components of UNAC is authorized at brigade/sector level.
      8. Visits. All visits within theatre will be coordinate by this HQ.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
   1. Administrative Orders. Mission Administrative Order will be published as Annex E to the Op O. The CARANA Director of Mission Support (DMS) will provide effective administrative, engineering, logistic and technical support for the operation of all components of UNAC and act as a financial ‘watchdog’. Sector 1 will be supported directly from central administrative base and sector regional administrative offices will provide support in the assigned AO.
   2. Each contingent support will be as per memorandums of understanding (MOUs) developed between UN and the contributing countries.
   3. Defensive Stores. Defensive stores are a mission control item. All requests to be forwarded to this HQ. Allocation to each sector, in addition to the basic load carried in theatre by contributing countries, will be authorized by this HQ.
   4. All direct cost for military support to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees will be captured and forwarded to this HQ through the Regional Administrative Officer (RAO).
   5. Medical. Formation’s medical support facilities will ensure first and second line care and first line evacuation. The mission will provide all casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) including emergency evacuation to field hospital, second-line care and stabilization before further evacuation. CASEVAC will be requested through the operating channel. Evacuation to home country remains with each contributing nation’s responsibilities.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS.
   1. Command.
      1. UNAC HQ.
         1. Phase 1: Forward HQ in GALASI.
         2. Phases 2 and 3: Main HQ and Alternate in GALASI.
   2. Communication. Code words, nicknames, passwords and Emergency Control Measures as per Annex F.

Acknowledge Instruction: ACK

M.S. Kinobe  
Major‑General  
Commander UNAC

Annexes:

Annex A – UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector  
Annex B – INTSUM 01 – Belligerents Organizations and Capabilities  
Annex C – Lines of Operations and Decisive Points  
Annex D – Sectors/Brigade Area of Operations  
Annex E – UNAC Administrative Order *(not issued)*Annex F – UNAC Communications and Electronics Emission Measures   
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Annex A to Op O 01  
HQ UNAC  
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UNAC TASK ORGANIZATION TABLE

| UNAC | UNAC HQ | SECTOR 1 | SECTOR 2 | SECTOR 3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| OPCOM | South Africa Maritime Reaction Squadron (-) (50) | 5 Mil Obs teams (30) | 9 Mil Obs teams (54) | 8 Mil Obs teams (48) |
|  | South Africa Field Hospital (180) |  |  |  |
|  | Egyptian MP Bn HQ (50) |  |  |  |
|  | Zambia Avn Sqn (-) (102) |  |  |  |
| OPCON | Nigeria HQ and Sig Sqn (200) | South Africa Brigade HQ/Sign Sqn (150) | BOT Brigade HQ/Sigs Sqn (150) | Ghana Brigade HQ and Sig Coy (150) |
|  | Staff Officers (160) | Rwanda Inf Coy (144) | BOTBATT Mech (600) | GHABATT (600) |
|  | CIMIC Coy (-) (40) | UGABATT + Log Coy (740) | MALBATT Mech (600) | NIGBATT Mech (600) |
|  |  | Kenya Inf Coy (120) | NAMBATT Mech (600) | Senegal Log Coy (150) |
|  |  | Zambia Field Engr Sqn (120) | Ethiopian Log Coy (150) | Ghana Field Engr Sqn (120) |
|  |  | South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48) | Kenyan Field Engr Sqn (120) | South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48) |

Annex A to OP O 01  
HQ UNAC  
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| UNAC | UNAC HQ | SECTOR 1 | SECTOR 2 | SECTOR 3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | South Africa Maritime Reaction Platoon (48) |  |
| TACOM | Algerian Int Coy (90) | CIMIC Det (6) | CIMIC Det (6) | CIMIC Det (6) |
|  |  | DDR Tm (10) | DDR Tm (10) | DDR Tm (10) |
| TACON |  | Egyptian MP Coy (90) | Egyptian MP Coy (80) | Egyptian MP Coy (90) |
|  |  |  | South African Forward Medical Detachment (80) | South African Forward Medical Detachment (80) |
|  |  |  | Zambian Aviation Flt (50) | Zambian Aviation Flt (50) |
| Total | 852 | 1458 | 2548 | 1942 |

Note 1: Command relationships were derived from the MOUs between the UN and the contributing countries. Specific tactical employment of the forces assigned are defined in these MOUs. Each nation must be consulted prior to using their forces assigned to UNAC in a role/task not identified in the MOU.

Annex B to Op O 01  
HQ UNAC  
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 01

### BELLIGERENT ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

1. Parti democratique de Carana (PDC). CARANA is essentially a one-party state. The PDC are internationally recognized as the legitimate government of CARANA having been founded in 1986 for the country’s first free elections. Jackson Ogavo, leader of the PDC, became the first elected president of CARANA. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realized, but over time, Ogavo’s focus changed, and he became preoccupied with quietly suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Beginning in 1995, he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The 1996 replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo’s Falin tribe was followed by an increasingly repressive regime, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. As in the government, the Carana Defence Forces (CDF) are dominated by the Falin and have become the de facto military arm of the party.

CARANA DEFENCE FORCES (CDF)

AIR FORCE

6 x Alpha Jet C

3 x Fokker 100

2 x Cessna 421

4 x F33C

6 x SA330H Puma

5 x SA316 Alouette

NAVY

6 x Suscal A

2 x LC-84

SOUTHERN AREA COMMAND

3 Inf Bn

4 Inf Bn

12 Recce Coy

CENTRAL AREA COMMAND

1 Inf Bn

11 Engr Coy

11 Recce Coy

WESTERN AREA COMMAND

5 Inf Bn

7 Inf Bn

11 Arty Bty

NORTHERN AREA COMMAND

2 Mech Bn

6 Inf Bn

1 Abn Bn

1 Arty Bn

1 Engr Bn

11 AAA Bty

11 MP Coy

CDF Band

2. CDF. The CDF consists of approximately 10,000 personnel in four ‘area commands’ and an air force, equipped with a mixture of former French, American and South African weapons and vehicles. The majority of equipment is in a poor state of repair. The most effective and best-equipped brigade, with some M3 APCs and AMX 13 tanks, is the Northern Area. The least effective and worst equipped is the Central Area. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats, the Navy plays a specialized but insignificant role in the Defence Force. The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. This limited capacity allowed the government to project its power over the entire country during the conflict. However, this limited capacity was not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups. Currently, the six Alpha Jets can be assessed as non‑operational. The CDF headquarters is collocated with PDC headquarters in GALASI.

3. Mouvement patriotique de Carana (MPC)*.* With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long‑term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the WEST as it is seen to have the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed. In some areas, the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the WEST – other elements remain compliant out of fear for the MPC.

1. Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5,000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.
2. The MPC is structured into groups of 750 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub‑commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good. The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from whence they conduct patrols WEST of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty, it has the potential to act as a trigger for other actions whether by mistake or by design.
3. The MPC is lightly armed with AK47 assault rifles, RPG7 anti-tank weapons and a variety of medium and heavy machine guns. They do not have any armoured vehicles but are extremely mobile using “technical’s” - light trucks mounting machine guns or recoilless rifles.

7. The official HQ of MPC is in ALUR, but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. After the end of fighting, the official HQ in ALUR increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in ALUR.

8. Independent combatants du Sud Carana (ICSC). The ICSC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the CDF, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The movement has also been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training. The ICSC lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and long-standing ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in LEPPKO province. Unlike the MPC, the ICSC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. It has never made an attempt to capitalize on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalized.

9. The public support for ICSC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population. During the fighting, ICSC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most ICSC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of ICSC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 2,000-3,000. They are equipped with assault rifles, light machine guns and anti‑tank weapons. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non‑combatants.

10. Hitherto, the ICSC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti‑government feelings in the SOUTH for most of its support; however there have been a number of recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the SOUTH of the area adjacent to the border with RIMOSA. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the ICSC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former, although this has not been corroborated.

11. Dispositions. Map of approximate dispositions of the belligerent factions to be issued.

Annex C to Op O 01  
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UNAC – LINE OF OPERATIONS AND DECISION POINTS

1. Belligerent’s Centres of Gravity.
   1. CDF. The CDF is the military wing of the recognized government. As such, their CG is their status as the legitimate military force of CARANA.
   2. MPC. The MPC is seen as having the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people where the government has failed. As a result, their CG is based on broad public support and general dissatisfaction with the government.
   3. ICSC. The ICSC draw their will to fight from a long history of economic neglect and violence against the local population. As a result, their CG is the support of dispossessed minorities, particularly from the Tatsi clan.
2. Lines of Operations.
   1. Stabilize the Country.
      1. DP 1 - Ensure all armed activities cease.
      2. DP 2 - Establish and maintain secure zones.
      3. DP 3 - Establish local agreements with all factions.
      4. DP 4 - Monitor ceasefire and take appropriate action when broken by any of the factions.
      5. DP 5 - Support the electoral process and initiatives toward good governance.
   2. Secure the Country.
      1. DP 1 - Ensure force security.
      2. DP 2 - Ensure freedom of movement.
      3. DP 3 - Protect all UN and UN related agencies and locals.
      4. DP 3 - Use minimum force to ensure adherence to the ceasefire and local agreements.
      5. DP 4 - Ensure the return of law and order.
   3. Obtain Support of CARANA Citizens.
      1. DP 1 - Support the provision of Humanitarian Assistance.
      2. DP 2 - Protect citizens of CARANA.
      3. DP 3 - Support the return of deportees, refugees and IDPs.
      4. DP 4 - Assist in the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure (i.e., schools, hospitals, etc.).
   4. Establish Unified Armed Forces of CARANA.
      1. DP 1 - Disarm factions.
      2. DP 2 - Demobilize factions.
      3. DP 3 – Reintegration.
      4. DP 4 - Training and formation.
      5. DP 5 – Establish citizen confidence in their new armed forces.
   5. Coordination with All Parties.
      1. DP 1 – Establish JCC structure.
      2. DP 2 – MOU with all of armed groups/factions involved.
      3. DP 3 – Establish other structures at mission and sector level to coordinate all activities including:
         1. Provision of humanitarian assistance.
         2. Return of IDPs and refugees.
         3. Electoral process.
         4. DDR process.
         5. Establishment of Rule of Law.

Annex D to Op O 01  
HQ UNAC  
D+30

UNAC - NET DIAGRAM

Sector 1

Sector 2

Sector 3

South Africa Maritime Reaction Squadron

Joint Logistic Centre (JLOG)

Nigeria HQ and Signals Squadron

UNAC HQ

Zambia Aviation Squadron

Egyptian MP Battalion

South Africa Field Hospital

Algerian Intelligence Company

CIMIC Company

**COLLECTIVE CALLS (CC)**

CC1 (Sectors) 1, 2 and 3

CC2 (Manoeuvre Units) 1, 2, 3, 4, 12 and 13

CC3 (GALASI Units) 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17 and 18

Annex E to Op O 01  
HQ UNAC  
D+30

UNAC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONTINGENT DEPLOYMENT

# INTRODUCTION

1. As a principal, the deployment of international contingents to UNAC will take place recognizing contingent requirements in regard to all deployment caveats as enumerated in superior orders and instructions.

2. In support, HQ UNAC will provide for liaison with contingents to facilitate effective monitoring of all deployment caveats.

# AIM

3. The aim of this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is to detail operational deployment caveats for UNAC contingents within CARANA AOs.

# CONTINGENT CAVEATS

4. Kenyan Field Engineer Squadron.

a. The Kenyan Field Engineer Squadron will deploy on assigned tasks in not less than troop strength for any period in excess of 24 hours. Where this guideline cannot be met, written authorization from the Kenyan National Authority is required.

b. Kenyan Field Engineer elements deployed on operational tasks will be provided with close protection.

5. Egyptian Military Police Company. The Egyptian Military Police Company will only conduct very important person (VIP) close protection tasks with the assistance of contingent troops from the AO within which they will be conducting close protection tasks.

6. Kenyan Battalion. The Kenyan Battalion will deploy elements into another contingent’s AO only when written authorization is received from the Kenyan National Authority. Such a deployment must be at least company strength in size.

7. Rwandan Battalion. All Rwandan National Holidays will be recognized with a reduction of unit duty strength to a minimum level without compromising contingent security.